By Peter Connolly
The Learjet 45 executive jet operated by the Irish Air Corps for the transport of government ministers and officials has been in service since 2004, so a decision regarding its replacement is clearly due, even overdue. We have to go back over 50 years to the first time an Irish government considered this matter.
EEC MEMBERSHIP
Ireland’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 had seismic consequences for the country in almost every aspect of society. To take just one prosaic area, whereas international engagements for government ministers and their officials had previously been limited, now they found themselves thrust into a whirlwind of EEC meetings, with regular heads of government summits spread across the whole community.
International airline connections to and from Ireland in the regulated/cartelised system then in effect meant that connections to the Continent were limited. National carrier Aer Lingus did fly to cities like Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam, but frequencies were rarely even daily; even when the flights of the European national carriers were added it was very hard to plan a day trip to Brussels, for example. The only European country with which Ireland had a dense network of air services was the United Kingdom, so frequently visits had to be arranged around a flight to London and an onward connection to the European city in question and then vice versa.
The Irish Air Corps had no suitable aircraft that might be used, nor did Aer Lingus have any interest in acting as an ad hoc charter provider for the government. The independent airline sector in Ireland was very limited and had no suitable aircraft either. Chartering an executive jet from a UK or Continental operator was possible but expensive, given that two dead-leg positioning flights were needed to and from Dublin.
‘FAT CATS’?
The Fianna Fáil government in power until March 1973 recognised the problem and actively considered the acquisition of an executive jet for ministerial use, but the incoming Fine Gael/Labour coalition quickly dismissed the idea. When Fianna Fáil returned to power in 1977 the situation was even worse, as the depth and extent of EEC meeting commitments had expanded and the further issue of a deteriorating security situation had added another dimension to the problem. The government knew what it wanted to do but in the difficult economic circumstances of the late 1970s it had to find a way to act that was not going to be politically damaging.
Most developed countries faced the same dilemma, and many accepted the need for secure and flexible travel arrangements for their leaders with seemingly little controversy. Countries like the US, Germany and France had fleets of aircraft dedicated to transporting heads of state and ministers. Even smaller countries like Belgium and Holland had that capability. In the UK and Ireland the matter has always been controversial, with both the media and opposition quick to castigate any plans to acquire suitable transport as extravagant, unnecessary and yet another perk for the ‘fat cats’ whilst ordinary people struggled to make ends meet. The optics were so terrible that even a politician as powerful as Tony Blair crumbled when faced with a media storm about plans for a ‘Blairforce One’.
CHOICE OF TWO
Nonetheless, in 1978 the government decided to proceed with the acquisition of a medium-sized executive jet seating eight people and able to operate non-stop to any point within the EEC. The aircraft was to be funded through the budget of the Department of Defence and was to be operated and maintained by the Air Corps on the military register. Whilst this was in line with virtually all the VIP operations of other European countries, it added a convenient layer of secrecy to the proceedings.
A tender for purchase was offered to all qualifying manufacturers, but this soon boiled down to the two with the most appropriate product: Dassault of France with their Falcon 20 and British Aerospace (BAE) with its 125-700B. Both manufacturers were invited to demonstrate their products in Ireland and to submit a best and final commercial proposal. During the last quarter of 1978 both manufacturers brought their aircraft to Casement Aerodrome at Baldonnel, where they were inspected and demonstrated to the representatives of the Department of Defence and Air Corps tasked with conducting the evaluation. There was little to choose between them in terms of price, capacity, range and performance. Both were well-established types with extensive in-service experience and market share. BAE had some advantages, the main one being that it was willing to offer an interim-leased aircraft with an early delivery. This offered the politicians two benefits, one being meeting their own transport requirements quickly, the other being establishing a fait accompli before the opposition had a chance to build up any momentum. The other advantage that BAE had was that its service centre was at Hawarden airport, near Chester, and its spares store was at Hatfield, just an hour from Heathrow, both more accessible than Dassault’s alternatives in Paris.
Whatever the truth of the matter, by February 1979 negotiations with BAE were under way. These took place at Casement Aerodrome and focused on the various contracts for the interim lease and the purchase agreement, the specification of the aircraft and the training programme for the Air Corps engineers and pilots who would maintain and fly it. Representatives from the Department of Defence led the Irish team, supported as necessary by appropriate specialists from the Air Corps.
FALSE JUSTIFICATIONS
Inevitably there was a growing awareness that the government was negotiating the acquisition of a jet. Perhaps to pre-empt and control the narrative, the Department of Defence issued a press release on 23 March 1979:
‘The aircraft will be operated by the Air Corps on such duties as pilot training, search and rescue, air ambulance and, as necessary, the transport of government ministers and officials especially to European Community meetings in Europe.’
This was an inversion of reality. The only pilot training would be that necessary to complete the conversion of new pilots onto the type. There were a few minor modifications made to facilitate the use of the aircraft in a maritime environment, by the addition, for example, of extra protective paint layers on surfaces that would be subject to salt spray. The aircraft had none of the equipment necessary for use in even a basic air ambulance configuration. In reality it would not be used for either purpose and was intended and used solely for the transport of ministers and officials.
That statement was repeated by the minister for defence in the Dáil on 3 May 1979, when he announced that a contract had been signed with BAE. In accordance with prevailing practice, he refused to tell the Dáil its value. In fact, taking account of the leased aircraft as well as the purchased one, the contract was in the region of £3,000,000 sterling.
LEASED AIRCRAFT A BIT OF A DOG
The interim-leased HS.125 was delivered on 1 June 1979 with Air Corps serial number 236. It had been built in 1970 as the development aircraft for the new Series 600, an extended version of the existing HS.125 range. It differed from the new aircraft that had been purchased in many respects but primarily in its use of older, much noisier and thirstier Rolls Royce Viper engines as opposed to the new Garrett TFE-731 engines fitted to the 700B model.
In truth, the leased aircraft was a bit of a dog, like many development aircraft subsequently converted for commercial use. When originally sold it had operated for four years in the Philippines, and when it returned its leather interior looked rather tired and worn. It had flown little since its return, so did not prove very reliable when put back into service, and the Air Corps and BAE had to work hard to keep it going. On 27 November 1979 it crashed, over-running the runway at Casement owing to an aborted take-off caused by birds; the three Air Corps personnel on board were fortunately uninjured. It was a write-off and BAE was more than happy to accept the insurance money for such an unloved aircraft.
FIRST PURCHASED JET SERVED FOR TWELVE YEARS
It is a measure of the good relationship between BAE and the Department of Defence that the aircraft was replaced with another leased 125-600B, delivered only one week later on 3 December 1979. This received the Air Corps serial number 239. It was in much better condition and served with the Air Corps until replaced by the purchased new aircraft in February 1980. The new aircraft, Air Corps 238, formed the nucleus of the new Ministerial Air Transport Service and was soon joined by a Beech King Air twin turboprop aircraft, Air Corps 240, also delivered in 1980. Conveniently this was a type genuinely used by the Air Corps for maritime patrol, so its acquisition was a less ostentatious move.
This unit evolved to become 102 Squadron of the Air Corps and remains today dedicated to ministerial transport. The 125-700B served with the unit for twelve years and the service is now on its third generation of executive jet. With the current jet due for replacement, the government is on the horns of the same dilemma as its predecessor in the 1970s.
Peter Connolly is a retired aviation executive who worked for British Aerospace on the Irish Government 125 Contract.
Further reading
B. Leatherbarrow, Hawker: the Great British business jet (Tonbridge, 2023).
D. MacCarron, Wings over Ireland: the story of the Irish Air Corps (Leicester, 1996).